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Abstract
The duty of  vigilance of  parent companies in respect of  the environ-
mental damage caused by the activities of  their subsidiaries abroad occupies 
an increasingly important place in various rights. While the legislator came 
to recognize this duty in French law, the judge offers him a place in Com-
mon Law and the companies themselves recognize it in the transnational 
order. However, this article aims to show how, in complement and interac-
tion, under the action of  the legislator, the judge and the addressees of  the 
duty, the bringing into play of  the responsibility of  the parent companies in 
a transnational dispute could be facilitated. The duty of  care could become 
an important tool of  environmental responsibility.
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Resumo
O dever de vigilância das empresas matrizes referente aos danos am-
bientais causados  pelas atividades de suas subsidiárias no exterior ocupa um 
lugar cada vez mais importante em vários direitos nacionais. Enquanto o 
legislador chegou a reconhecer este dever na lei francesa, o juiz oferece-lhe 
um espaço no Common Law e as próprias empresas reconhecem-no na 
ordem transnacional. No entanto, este artigo tem como objetivo mostrar 
como, sob a ação e a articulação do legislador, do juiz e dos destinatários 
do dever, a responsabilidade das empresas matrizes em uma disputa trans-
nacional poderia ser facilitada. O dever de diligência pode se tornar uma 
importante ferramenta da responsabilidade ambiental.
Palavras-chave: Diligência, Direito francês, Juiz, Direito nacional, Direito 
transnacional.
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1 Introduction
Our contribution aims to show how the duty of  vi-
gilance1, or duty of  care, of  companies that exists in 
various domestic legal orders, enshrined in legislation or 
case law, and in the transnational order in the form of  
“soft law”, could lead, if  breached and in the context of  
a transnational dispute, to the establishment of  an en-
vironmental civil liability for parent companies and the-
reby contribute to improving environmental protection. 
Transnational environmental disputes are complex2. 
This is due, on the one hand, to the relocation of  busi-
ness operations that allows large corporations to carry 
out their business via subsidiaries based overseas and, 
on the other hand, to the globalisation of  environmen-
tal threats, namely the fact that a threat created by a 
company located in one country A can result in harmful 
consequences for victims domiciled in another country 
B. While the former is perfectly exemplified by the Shell 
decision, where Nigerian citizens and a Dutch NGO 
sought compensation, before a Dutch court, from the 
Shell parent company domiciled in the Netherlands 
and from its Nigerian subsidiary for the environmen-
tal harm caused by oil spills in the Niger Delta3, the 
RWE case currently pending before a German court, 
brought by a Peruvian farmer against German corpora-
tion RWE regarding climate damage allegedly caused by 
the activities of  this energy giant domiciled on German 
soil, is emblematic of  the latter4.
In this type of  dispute, the victims’ goal is to bring 
before the forum court, in addition to the overseas sub-
sidiary if  the latter is directly responsible for the pre-
judice in country B, the parent company domiciled in 
country A. The extraterritorial reach of  the duty of  care 
1 S. Schiller (dir.), Le devoir de vigilance, LexisNexis, 2019.
2 See Report : HAUTEREAU-BOUTONNET, M.; TRUILHÉ, 
E. Le procès environnemental, du procès sur l’environnement au 
procès pour l’environnement, soutenu par la Mission de Recherche 
Droit et Justice, 2019. Available in: http://www.gip-recherche-justice.
fr/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/16.31-RF-mai-2019.pdf  Access 
in: 10 jun. 2019.
3 V. Appeal Court of  La Haye, 18 déc. 2015 and the comments, 
C. BRIGHT, C. Quelques réflexions à propos de l’affaire Shell 
aux Pays-Bas. SFDI L’entreprise multinationale et le droit international, 
Pedone, 2016. p. 127.
4 See LLuiya v. RWE, currently before Appeal Court of  Hamm 
(Germany). The case was admited (13 nov. 2017). See comments: 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2017/12/07/the-
huaraz-case-lluiya-v-rwe-german-court-opens-recourse-to-climate-
law-suit-against-big-co2-emitter/
of  companies should enable the courts, subject to cer-
tain conditions imposed by the various applicable laws, 
to find parent companies liable for the harm caused on 
foreign land by the activities of  their subsidiaries. 
What is this duty we are discussing here? In France, 
the devoir de vigilance is set out in the law of  27 March 
2017, which requires certain French parent and subcon-
tracting companies to draw up and implement a vigilan-
ce plan to prevent the occurrence of  harm to the health 
and safety of  employees and of  human rights and envi-
ronmental violations caused by their activities and those 
of  their commercial partners5. In other legal systems, 
the courts have been the ones to recognise this duty. 
Thus, in common law systems, due diligence consists in 
a more general duty stemming from tort law rather than 
company law. On a closer look, as underlined by a num-
ber of  authors, there are already some signs that reveal 
the willingness of  common law judges to use this duty 
of  care as a tool to demand from certain companies a 
more diligent conduct with regard to the risks created 
by their activities and those of  their subsidiaries and, in 
the event of  a breach, to find them liable.
This observation reminds us that, as a supplement 
or as a remedy to the shortcomings of  legislators, the 
courts of  all domestic legal orders do have the power to 
change the legal landscape and contribute to improving 
environmental justice. And, it must be pointed out that 
these evolutions of  domestic laws, through the action 
of  legislators (I) and of  the courts (II), could be rein-
forced on contact with transnational law (III) and, thus, 
taking a global perspective of  the law, contribute to im-
proving the compensation of  environmental harm.
2  French law: the scope of a duty of 
vigilance established by the legislator
In the event of  environmental damage caused by the 
overseas subsidiary of  a French group of  companies, 
victims should act against the French parent company, 
5 L. n° 2017-399, 27 mars 2017, JO 28 mars 2017, texte n° 1; S 
SCHILLER, S. Exégèse de la loi relative au devoir de vigilance des 
sociétés mères et entreprises donneuses d’ordre. LexisNexis, 2017. 
p. 622; DANIS-FATÔME, A.; VINEY, G. La responsabilité civile 
dans la loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des 
entreprises donneuses d’ordre. Recueil Dalloz, Dalloz, 2017. p. 1610; 
B. PARANCE, B.; GROULT E. Regards croisés sur le devoir de 
vigilance et la duty of  care. Journal du Droit International, 2018.
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supposed to be more robust than its subsidiaries to 
sustain their claim for compensation6. To do so, they 
must establish the French court’s jurisdiction and seek 
the application of  a legal rule suitable to find the pa-
rent company liable on the merits. That the French 
courts have jurisdiction is not an issue. Regulation (EC) 
n° 1215/2012 of  12 December 2012, Brussels I bis 
(on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of  judgments in civil and commercial matters) provides 
that the claimant may sue in the courts for the domicile 
of  persons domiciled in a Member state (art. 4.1). And 
thus, is it possible for foreign victims to bring procee-
dings before a French judge when the parent company 
is domiciled in France. However, traditionally, even if  
jurisdiction is established, itfor the judge not to be able 
to rely on any French legal rule to find a defendant lia-
ble. It should be pointed out that, pursuant to article 
4.1 of  regulation n° 864/2007 of  11 July 2007 (Rome 
II) on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, 
in civil liability matters, the law applicable is the law of  
the country where the damage occurs. However, as an 
exception, article 7 of  the regulation enables the vic-
tim, when environmental damage is involved, to choose 
between the law of  the place where the damage occur-
red and the law of  the place where the harmful event 
took place, in this case the head office of  the parent 
company. Assuming that victims opt for the law of  the 
harmful event, this makes no difference. Under French 
law, as in many other legal systems, because of  the patri-
monial autonomy of  companies, the “group” does not 
constitute a legal entity and the “parent company” is not 
liable for the harmful actions of  its subsidiaries7. The-
re is currently no general liability of  a parent company 
for the actions of  its subsidiaries. Admittedly, there are 
some exceptions8. The corporate veil can be lifted if  
the facts demonstrate a subsidiary’s lack of  patrimonial 
autonomy. A court may view the subsidiary as a mere 
fictitious company or, if  this is not possible, rely on the 
theory of  perception by third parties or the theory of  
interference by the parent company in the management 
of  its subsidiary, in order to find such parent company 
6 BOSKOVIC, O. Brèves remarques sur le devoir de vigilance et 
le droit international privé. Européen et international, 2016; La com-
pétence des juridictions des pays source pour connaître des actions 
intentées à l’encontre des entreprises multinationales, Dalloz, Point 
de vue, p. 732; Fascicule 146-30 Droit international privé et envi-
ronnement, JurisClasseur Droit international, LexisNexis.
7 See Cass. Com. 15 nov. 2011, n° 10-21.701.
8 See La responsabilité dans les groupes de sociétés, Actes pratiques et 
ingénierie sociétaire préc.
liable for the debt of  its subsidiary. Here however, the 
conditions for lifting the veil are rarely met, and envi-
ronmental matters are no exception9. 
The entry into force of  the law of  27 March 2017 
was a game changer, not only for parent companies, but 
also subcontracting companies – and they can some-
times be both -, if  they employ a certain number of  
employees (over 5,000 employees in France or 10,000 
employees in France and abroad) and have their registe-
red office in France. More specifically, these companies 
are now required to draw up and implement a vigilan-
ce plan. Pursuant to article L. 225-102-4-1, paragraph 
3, of  the French Commercial code, this plan “includes 
reasonable vigilance measures suitable to identify risks 
and prevent serious violations of  human rights and fun-
damental freedoms as well as harm to the health and 
safety of  individuals and to the environment, resulting 
from the activities of  the company and those of  the 
companies it controls within the meaning of  paragraph 
II of  article L. 233-16, directly or indirectly, as well as 
the activities of  subcontractors or suppliers with whom 
an established commercial relationship exists, when 
these activities are linked to this relationship”10. Should 
companies fail to comply, the legislator has specifically 
provided that they shall be directly liable, in accordance 
with the general rules of  civil liability, for the damage 
that the performance of  these obligations would have 
avoided (article L. 225-102-5 of  the Commercial code). 
We see how this mechanism could be of  interest 
in the context of  a transnational dispute. The vigilan-
ce plan includes the activities of  a company’s overseas 
subsidiaries, subcontractors and suppliers. The French 
duty of  vigilance has an extraterritorial reach. Hence, in 
the future, a French transnational company could find 
itself  before a court to answer for environmental harm 
caused in a foreign country if  such harm could have 
been avoided by the effective implementation of  a vi-
gilance plan imposed pursuant to the new French duty 
of  vigilance. It is true that the scope of  this duty of  vi-
gilance remains limited. Besides the fact that it does not 
apply to all large corporations, the doctrine highlights 
how difficult it would be to prove the causal link be-
tween a breach of  the duty of  vigilance and the damage 
involved11. In that case, reverting back to general rules 
9 HANNOUN, C. La responsabilité environnementale des socié-
tés mères. Revue Environnement, 2009.
10 Our translation. 
11 A. Danis-Fâtome et G. Viney, art. préc.
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of  civil liability, a court would have to determine whe-
ther, on the basis of  its personal responsibility, the pa-
rent company may have committed a fault that resulted 
in the damage caused by its subsidiary. However, like 
certain foreign judges when applying the duty of  care 
that exists in common law systems, the courts’ power of  
interpretation could enable them to bring about certain 
evolutions.
3  Common law: the scope of a duty of 
care construed by the courts
As under French law, under Common Law, there is 
no vicarious liability of  parent companies for the harm 
caused by their subsidiary. However, they can be found 
directly liable for negligence if  there is a pre-existing 
duty of  care, a duty owed by certain persons towards 
other natural or legal persons because of  their proxi-
mity12.
Each jurisdiction carries its own interpretation. For 
example, in England, the establishment by a court of  a 
duty of  care depends on the assessment of  three ele-
ments stemming from the ruling in Caparo Industries plc/ 
Dickman13 : 1) the foreseeability of  the damage caused to 
the claimant, 2) the proximity between the claimant and 
the defendant, and 3) that it is fair, just and reasonable 
to impose a duty of  care in light of  the facts of  the case 
or of  the wider political context. If  all these elements 
are satisfied, the company can potentially incur liability 
for lack of  due diligence if  damage occurs. This is how, 
in the case of  Chandler v/ Cape dated 25 April 201214, 
an English court found a British parent company liable 
for the health-related damage suffered by the employees 
of  its subsidiary because of  the activities of  the latter, 
after considering that, not only did the parent company 
know of  the risks caused by the activities of  its subsi-
diary (foreseeability), but also, there were policies ap-
plicable in relation to health issues that applied to the 
whole group, and it was fair, just and reasonable for the 
parent company to owe a duty of  care in this respect15. 
12 Not. R.-C. Drouin, art. préc.
13 Case rendered By House of  Lords in 1990, 2 A.C. 605. https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id =2626806
14 Court of  Appeal R.U., 25 avril 2012. See H. Muir Watt, Revue 
critique de droit international privé, 2013, p. 632.
15 Sur ce rappel M.-C. DROUIN, R.C. Le développement du con-
tentieux à l’encontre des entreprises transnationales: quel rôle pour 
A review of  the case law shows that, on several oc-
casions, by making a detour via the substantial condi-
tions governing liability in order to rule on matters of  
jurisdiction, a number of  judges, in particular English, 
Dutch and Canadian judges16, appear to be ready to ac-
cept the liability of  parent companies for the environ-
mental harm caused by their subsidiaries. 
On the English side, the ruling in Dominic Liswani-
so Lungowe v/ Vedanta Ressources by the UK’s Court of  
Appeal on 13 October 2017 and by the Supreme Court 
on 10 April 201917 is topical. In this case, a group of  
Zambian victims brought proceedings in respect of  
discharges of  harmful substances due to the mining 
activity of  the Zambia-based subsidiary of  parent com-
pany Vedanta Ressources18. To accept jurisdiction, the 
court accepted that the liability of  the parent company 
could be envisaged based on the applicable law, in that 
instance Zambian law, which is derived from common 
law and identical to English law. Thus, it is by expan-
ding its approach, not only to cases of  property, physi-
cal and environmental damage suffered by third parties 
– beyond employees –, but also to cases of  damage cau-
sed by overseas subsidiaries, that the court accepted its 
jurisdiction with regard to a subsidiary, in addition to 
the parent company.
As for the Netherlands, it was in the Shell decision 
that a Dutch court accepted jurisdiction with regard to 
Royal Dutch (Shell) and its Nigerian subsidiary. This 
case involved a lawsuit brought by Nigerian farmers 
who sought compensation for environmental harm 
(soil and water contamination from oil spills) and hu-
man rights violations19. To support their claim, the vic-
tims had argued that the law applicable to the merits of  
the case was Nigerian law, which is based on common 
law and thus recognises a duty of  care. Pointing to the 
le devoir de vigilance? Droit social, 2016. p. 246.
16 About this evolution see : H. Muir Watt, « Compétence du juge 
anglais en matière de responsabilité de la société mère pour les dom-
mages causés par sa filiale à l’étranger », Revue critique de droit inter-
national privé 2017, p. 613 ; R.-C. Drouin, art. préc. ; SAUMIER, G. 
L’ouverture récente des tribunaux canadiens aux poursuites dirigées 
contre les sociétés mères pour les préjudices causés par leurs filiales 
à l’étranger. Revue critique de droit international privado, 2018. p. 775.
17 Vedante Resources PLC and another v Lungowe and others, 
2019, UKSC 20.
18 Royal Court of  Justice, 13 oct. 2017, v. http://www.bailii.org/
ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2017/1528.html
19 BRIGHT, C. Quelques réflexions à propos de l’affaire Shell 
aux Pays-Bas. SFDI L’entreprise multinationale et le droit international, 
Pedone, 2016. p. 127.
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potential liability of  a parent company on the basis of  
the decision in Chandler v. Cape, the Dutch court was 
able to accept jurisdiction. 
Lastly, we must highlight the importance of  the Ca-
nadian court in the case of  Choc c./ Hudbay Minerals Inc, 
ruled on by the Ontario Superior court in 2013 and in-
volving, once again, a mining company20. Although the 
claimants located on Guatemalan soil (members of  an 
indigenous Mayan population) were seeking remedy for 
human rights violations caused by the security person-
nel of  the subsidiary of  Canadian company Hudbay, the 
reasoning is transposable to environmental cases. In this 
instance, when ruling on the admissibility of  the claim, 
the court found that the parent company could poten-
tially be found liable because the three criteria necessary 
for the establishment of  a duty of  case were satisfied.
These cases do not change the fact that, when it co-
mes to the merits of  a case, a court may decide not to 
sanction a parent company. Hence, in the Shell case, in 
the end, the court found, for reasons of  opportunity, 
justice and equity, that the company had not breached 
its duty of  care21. However, by contemplating the po-
tential liability of  parent companies in order to accept 
jurisdiction, judges show that the concept of  a duty of  
care is a very malleable standard that could enable them 
to take the leap and actually find a company liable. This 
is all the more compelling that, when taking a closer 
look at this line of  cases, we see that this standard is 
bound to evolve on contact with the conduct, within 
the transnational order, of  corporations themselves.
4  The transnational order: the scope 
of a duty of care accepted by 
corporations 
The duty of  care or vigilance also finds its source in 
various instruments stemming from the transnational – 
non-state – order which, as part of  the normative world 
of  CSR (corporate social responsibility), call for com-
panies to exercise due diligence by acting within their 
“sphere of  influence” to prevent human rights viola-
tions and harm to the health and safety of  workers and 
20 Choc c/ Hudbay minerals, Superior Court of  Ontario, CV-10-
411159, Judge Master Graham, 29 juin 2013.
21 Tribunal District La Haye, 30 janvier 2013 et Appeal Court La 
Haye, 18 déc. 2015 : 
to the environment22. Thus, it is included in the OECD 
Guidelines for multinational enterprises23, in the ISO 
26000 standard providing guidance on social responsi-
bility of  organisations published in November 2010 and 
in the guiding principles on business and human rights 
(drawn up by John Ruggie, the Special representative 
of  the secretary general on human rights and transna-
tional corporations and other business enterprises and 
approved by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 
17/4 of  16 June 2011)24. Although these are voluntary 
commitments, still, when companies adhere to them, 
they agree to implement the various recommendations 
and, to do so, to take measures allowing them to ensure 
that their activities do not cause harm, in particular to 
human rights and to the environment. To achieve this, 
they can, for instance, adopt codes of  good practice 
or impose sustainable development clauses in certain 
agreements entered into with their suppliers.  
Now, couldn’t the courts rely on these voluntary 
commitments to establish the existence of  a duty of  
care pursuant to tort law, or of  a faute civile in a civil 
law context? Couldn’t these commitments lead to a re-
newed interpretation of  the duty of  care capable of  
making parent companies liable if  damage is caused by 
their subsidiaries and, ultimately, other commercial par-
tners? Since the duty of  care is a standard, its content 
is bound to evolve in parallel with social transforma-
tions and with what is “normally expected” today from 
a transnational enterprise. An increasing number of  au-
thors support this and consider that it is how CSR could 
be grasped by the law25. In practical terms, the idea is 
as follows: in addition to the fact that companies that 
22 See S. Schiller (dir.), Le devoir de vigilance, LexisNexis, 2019.
23 http://www.oecd.org/fr/investissement/mne/2011102-fr.pdf
24 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/Intro-
ductionsGuidingPrinciples_fr.pdf
25 See R. de QUENAUDON, R.; MARTIN-CHENUT, K. La 
RSE saisie par le droit. Paris: Pedone, 2016.; ABADIE, P. Le juge 
et la responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise. Recueil Dalloz, n. 6, p. 
302-308, 2018 ; v. aussi, I. DESBARATS, I. La RSE à la française, 
où en est-on? Droit social, 2018. p. 525 ; P. Deumier, « La récep-
tion du droit souple par l’ordre juridique », in Le droit souple, Asso-
ciation Henri Capitant, coll. Thèmes et commentaires Dalloz 2009, 
p. 122 ; Responsabilité sociale des entreprises, Répertoire Dalloz Sociétés, 
F.G. Trébulle ; M.P. BLIN, M. P; DESBARATS, I.; JAZOTTES G.; 
VIDALENS, V. Entreprise et développement durable: approche ju-
ridique pour l’acteur économique du XIXe siècle. Revue juridique de 
l’Environnement, v. 2, p. 403-404, 2011. p. 120. V. aussi M. HAU-
TEREAU-BOUTONNET, M. Une illustration du droit global, la lex 
mercatoria climatique. Brazilian Journal of  International Law, v. 14, 2017. 
Available in: https://www.publicacoesacademicas.uniceub.br/rdi/
article/view/4998 Access in: 10 jun. 2019.
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commit to adopting a diligent approach with regard to 
the risks created directly or indirectly by their activities, 
could be blamed for wrongful conduct if  damage oc-
curred as a result of  the non-observance of  their com-
mitments, more generally, the multiplication of  these 
voluntary commitments could be the manifestation of  
a new custom applicable to all transnational enterprises, 
on which courts could rely to assess the various criteria 
surrounding the common law concept of  a duty of  care 
and civil law concept of  a faute. 
The first signs of  this can already be seen. 
In France, already, in the Erika case that led to To-
tal incurring liability for the environmental harm cau-
sed by the tanker it had chartered, the French judge did 
not hesitate to rely on voluntary norms to assess the 
criminal wrongdoing of  the company26. While the con-
trol exercised over its subsidiary was deduced from the 
terms of  the charter-party imposing certain diligence 
practices in favour of  the parent company, the failu-
re of  this control was assessed in light of  the vetting 
rules (a preventive contractual instrument in maritime 
transport law) put in place at the request of  the parent 
company itself. And, more importantly, the Paris Court 
of  appeal, in a ruling dated 19 December 2013, did not 
hesitate to consider a director’s wrongdoing, stating 
that “an increasing number of  investors are focused on 
“engagement” (…)” and “that a listed company cannot 
ignore its shareholders’ practices which today are con-
sidered ‘normal’”27. Thus, as a result of  common prac-
tices emerges a requirement imposing a conduct that is 
normally expected from enterprises with regard to risk 
management.
As for foreign courts, while traces do appear in the 
Vedanta jurisprudence, it was mostly in the aforemen-
tioned Hudbay case that the judge underlined the im-
portance of  the various public commitments made by 
the parent company. Some had to do with the standards 
of  conduct applicable to its security guards, others rela-
ted to human rights, such as the subscription to the vo-
luntary principles regarding security and human rights. 
Furthermore, in the Shell decision, in order to accept ju-
risdiction, the court did not hesitate to highlight that the 
duty of  care owed by the parent company was justified 
by the fact that the latter acknowledged it by adopting 
26 Cass. 25 septembre 2012, n° 10-82938.
27 Paris, 19 déc. 2013, n° 12/22644, Rev. Sociétés 2014, p. 306, com-
ments A. Viandier. [Our translation]
certain voluntary commitments towards the prevention 
of  environmental harm, such as codes of  good practi-
ce. And at that point, the court even suggested that in 
the next stage of  the appeal, the court should consi-
der, in light of  various issues, whether these voluntary 
commitments had in fact led to the adoption of  certain 
mechanisms, the absence of  which would prove wrong-
doing. Thus, as explained by Renée-Claude Drouin, the-
se commitments provide a basis for the demonstration, 
altogether, of  the foreseeability of  the damage, of  the 
existence of  a certain degree of  proximity with third 
parties, and of  the politically acceptable nature of  this 
duty of  care. 
This study thus reveals that it is through a combina-
tion and a convergence of  state and non-state, hard and 
soft, both imposed and voluntarily accepted, laws, that 
the duty of  care of  transnational companies as recogni-
sed in the various legal orders could become an essen-
tial tool for the compensation of  environmental harm.
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